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of the law. Such subjects are carefully avoided in our most progressive
law schools. Students in whom a responsive chord is struck will find a
wealth of footnote references bearing on the subject.
DONALD J. HOLLINGSWORTH
PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAw-A. L. Good-
hart. Stevens & Sons, Ltd., London, Eng., 1934
In this book Professor Goodhart sets out to compare the merits of
the common law doctrine of binding precedent with the continental
theory of precedent established by practice.
Becoming particularly interested in the question of just what are the
arguments in support of the English system Professor Goodhart discovers
that for the most part he can agree with none of them. He does give
one justifiable reason for the common law doctrine and that was the
early need for certainty in the law of England. This need was not so
crying in continental countries for there, even before the Codes, there
was the background of Roman law which furnished a legal system of
developed doctrines.
In building up a body of law there is a great need for certainty;
there must be firm principles upon which the framework rests. This
need for certainty in the development of the English law gave rise to
the theory of binding precedents, for the entire job of construction was
thrown upon the English judges. Precedents were the nails with which
the English legal edifice was held together.
It would seem then that if any other binding force is present prece-
dent does not become important unless it would be to bolster up the
weak places in the structure. On the Continent the Codes were devel-
oped and thus formed a framework for law. The theory of precedent
was not necessary but where a general practice developed under the
Codes precedent eventually fixed that practice.
Professor Goodhart then takes issue with Mr. W. M. Best who
assumes that if the English law were codified, the common law doctrine
of precedent would be the better method of interpretation. This is
hardly true he maintains, for to impose upon the statutes a doctrine of
strict interpretation would soon make them inflexible.
Professor Goodhart then indicates that English law is codified to a
far greater degree than most people realize; and claims that the binding
precedent theory of interpretation is no longer a good one. His respect
for the important part which precedent played in the development of
English law is perhaps the only thing which prevents Professor Good-
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hart from completely abandoning the doctrine of binding precedents.
A legal system thoroughly established no longer requires the use of such
a doctrine. Quoting from Professor Carleton Kemp Allen, to whose
chair at Oxford he had just succeeded, Professor Goodhart says: "An
English statute is not very old before it ceases to be a dry generalization
and is seen through the medium of a number of concrete examples. The
result is often startlingly different from what the enactment would seem
to have intended."'  Seemingly to prove his point as made in the above
quotation Professor Goodhart footnotes a quotation from Joseph Kohler
which in part follows: "Interpretation may change and cannot but
change. For instance, the interpretation of the French Code Civil has,
within a hundred years, undergone many changes.... Thus the whole
law of unfair competition has grown out of two sections (1382, 1383)
to which originally nobody had been able to ascribe any such meaning." 2
From these quotations can be drawn the iuthor's point of view.
While the original intendment of a statute may be completely changed
under either a binding precedent or non-binding precedent theory of
law, it is far better to follow the non-binding theory thus avoiding the
"freezing" of a statute with its first interpretation.
In a brief appendix Profesor Goodhart raises the question as to
whether or not the Permanent Court of International Justice will adopt
the binding precedent theory. Because of the present state of interna-
tional law Professor Goodhart discerns a need for certainty which would
justify the use of a binding precedent theory until international law be-
comes more firmly established as a system.
Professor Goodhart thus recognizes the fact that there is much
to be said for binding precedents but when their use reaches a certain
stage in the development of a legal system-a stage where continued
application of the theory obstructs rather than aids further building and
improvement, then the theory must be changed if not completely dis-
carded.
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'Law in the Makitng (znd ed.), 193o, at p. 110.
2 Joseph Kohler, Judicial Interpretation of Enacted Law, IX Modern
Legal Philosophy Series I92.
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